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① Bae, Kee-Hong, Jun-Koo Kang, and Jin-Mo Kim, 2002, Tunneling or value added? Evidence from mergers by 








































                                                        
① 根据本文整理的数据，在 1998 年到 2003 年间，大型并购重组事件中（涉及金额超过 2000 万元且超过公







































































































































Some M&A happened only to satisfy the controlling shareholders’ self-interest 
intention. Even these M&A is not necessary or disadvantary to the company. 
Bea, Kang and Kim (2002) show that managerial objective and corporate 
governance playing important role in manager’s M&A decision. Tunneling is the only 
true motivation in some M&A. 
The M&A of controlling shareholders’ self-interest intention (hereafter we brief 
call it: self-interest M&A) in this paper, is the M&A that controlling shareholder make 
use of controlling power to get private benefit trough M&A while other shareholder 
cannot get advantage or even be expropriated. Tunneling through M&A is the main 
self-interest M&A and harm greatly. The self-interest M&A exist in most countries 
especially stand out and intensely in the background of  “single big shareholder” in 
China. 
In the situation of highly concentrated ownership, controlling shareholder often 
mission top managers and dominate the strategy and daily operation. The minority 
shareholder usually disables to participate in operation, and have a virtual agency 
relationship. 
The existence of blockholder have dual act on the minority shareholder and 
company’s value. In the one side, as possess most cash flow of the company, the 
blochholder have the motivation to supervise the managers and strive for the 
maximum of company’s value, thus coming into being the incentive effect. In the 
other side, the blockholder control the company, being able to get the private benefit 
on the expense of minority shareholders’ interest, thus coming into being the 
entrenchment effect. The appearance of self-interest M&A is the result of the 
entrenchment effect becoming dominated. 
The self-interest M&A mainly achieve through connected party M&A, but not all 
the connected party M&A are self-interest M&A. Some times the blockholder help the 
listed company by connected party M&A. Friedman, Johnson and Mitton (2003) 
showed that controlling shareholder would use private resources to save the listed 
company in case of financial distress, that is propping. The appearance of propping is 
the result of the incentive effect becoming dominated. Minority shareholders are 
benefited or harmed by the controlling shareholder’s different behaviors. The 
incentive effect and the entrenchment effect existing at the same time and acting on 
opposite direction, increase the difficult of studying the self-interest M&A. The 













complicatedly is the hotspot in the academicals field. 
In our county, the controlling shareholders of listed company usually possess 
high percent shares and dominate the board and management, so can self-interest 
conveniently. In the outside of listed company, the law that protects investors is 
perfected stage by stage. The main agency conflict exists between controlling 
shareholder and minority shareholders. The controlling shareholder tunneling the 
company by self-interest M&A has run to serious situation. While studying the 
motivations, types and effects systemically are still insufficient. 
As the relative studying show, the controlling shareholder’s behaviors obey the 
Homo Economics and often seek maximum of self-interest and expropriate minority 
shareholders. Most propping is mid and short time aim, the ultimate target is still 
tunneling. Only when the listed company is faced with “preserve listed position” or  
“preserve the chance of seasoned equity offering” that affect the long-run interest, the 
controlling shareholder would propping the listed company through connected party 
M&A, and after aim achieved the controlling shareholders would expropriate the 
minority shareholders again. Propping is the controlling shareholder realizes long-run 
interest at the expense of short time interest. Expropriating minority shareholders is 
the true purpose of controlling shareholder. Of course, there are still some controlling 
shareholders impel M&A to integrate the resources between controlling shareholders 
and listed companies. But tunneling through M&A has become large party of all the 
M&A. 
The controlling shareholder’s propping and tunneling hide in the connected party 
M&A and often go through mixed and time and again, which puzzles the minority 
shareholders and supervisors. Therefore, it is necessary to study self-interest M&A 
deeply for the healthy development of stock market. People want to know which kind 
of M&A is self-interest? How the controlling shareholder gets private benefit through 
self-interest?  What factors make the M&self-interest?  Is the market able to detect 
the self-interest M&A? What degree the minority shareholders are harmed? How to 
prevent the controlling shareholder from expropriating minority shareholders? 
Because of the secrete character of self-interest behavior, maybe we can only use 
indirect evidence to study tunneling. This paper design empirical study method, 
eliminating interfering factors, matching the self-interest M&A and no self-interest 
M&A, analyzing M&A all-round, especially focus on the effect cash flow and 
accounting index, to recognize the aim of controlling shareholder. The objective of 
this paper is to see through the self-interest M&A and identify the measures and 
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